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5.1 Introduction
As a major player in international capital markets, the United States of-
ten receives attention as a source of global macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
and, more recently, a destination for global savings resources. Since banks
play a central role in the ﬁnancial systems of many economies, they may be
active in transmitting these ﬂuctuations. Within banking, recent years have
been marked by the dramatic rise in foreign ownership of banks, especially
in emerging market economies. This compositional shift has raised ques-
tions about associated bank claims altering the extent of ﬁnancial-sector
depth in markets, expanding opportunities for international risk sharing
and consumption smoothing in response to idiosyncratic country shocks,
leading to altered international transmission of disturbances, and altering
the institutions in the source and destination markets. Supporters see the
foreign banks as key sources of otherwise scarce capital, with broader pos-
itive spillovers on the stability and eﬃciency of local ﬁnancial markets.
Critics of industrialized-country banks participating in emerging markets
sometimes argue that these banks are unstable lenders that undermine lo-
cal ﬁnancial markets. The debate on whether foreign lenders are ﬁckle con-
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data assistance.tinues to rage (Galindo, Micco, and Powell 2004) and underscores the im-
portance of fact ﬁnding and communications on the international lending
practices of industrialized-country banks.
This paper explores patterns in U.S. bank claims on foreign partners.
U.S. banks have emerged as key participants in international banking and
are particularly active in European and Latin American countries, with the
latter group having faced tumultuous periods in recent decades. This mo-
tivates our contrast between the determinants and trends in international
capital ﬂows from U.S. banks to European and Latin American counter-
parties. As in Goldberg (2002), these capital ﬂows are analyzed using data
from a time series panel of individual U.S. banks that report exposures to
foreign markets. These reports are ﬁled quarterly by each U.S. bank (or
bank holding company) to support the bank supervisory process of the
Federal Reserve, Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, and Oﬃce of
Comptroller of the Currency. The banks report the country-by-country
distribution of their foreign exposures, the form of these exposures (cross-
border claims and local claims—i.e., claims extended by the aﬃliates of
U.S. banks located in foreign markets), valuations of derivative positions
held, some maturity composition details, and broad categories of recipi-
ents of U.S. claims by destination market.1
Four interesting ﬁndings arise in our current examination of data, which
extends through mid-2004. First, claims extended by larger U.S. reporting
banks tend to be less volatile than claims by smaller U.S. banks. Second,
while there have been some declines in cross-border ﬂows to Latin Ameri-
can counterparties, larger U.S. banks have had robust trend growth in
local claims on Latin America. Third, local claims tend to be more stable
than cross-border claims. Finally, there is at best mixed evidence in support
of the idea that U.S. international claims are cyclically driven, where cycli-
cal forces are proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates and
interest rates. While U.S. bank cross-border claims on European counter-
parties tend to expand with European growth performance, these sensitiv-
ities are not robust, and the explanatory power of these forces is low. We do
not observe stable transmission of U.S. or destination market cycles into
either Latin American or European partners, in either cross-border or local
claims.2
These ﬁndings build on Goldberg (2002), wherein it was observed that
the U.S. banks engaged in international lending had become more diverse
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1. The term “U.S. banks” in this paper generally includes U.S.-owned banks, bank holding
companies, and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks. The reported data also are combined with
similar data from other countries to form the consolidated data on international bank lend-
ing reported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
2. BIS (2004) provides a thoughtful overview of issues from the perspective of source and
host countries of ﬁnancial-sector FDI. Goldberg (2007) surveys the host-country implica-
tions of ﬁnancial-sector foreign direct investment and draws parallels between the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial-sector FDI and FDI in manufacturing and extractive resource industries.since the 1980s, with fewer banks overall, and the remaining banks be-
coming increasingly polarized in terms of size and portfolio allocations. By
the late 1990s, while a substantial share of the U.S. banks reporting foreign
exposures were smaller banks, the vast majority of U.S. exposures were
nonetheless attributable to a few large banks. Lending by the larger banks
is less volatile than lending by the smaller banks.
Our ﬁndings of weak and variable cyclical transmission from the U.S.
banks contrast with stronger results by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000a)
on Japanese business-cycle transmission to the United States. Our results
also contrast with those of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), who ﬁnd
more transmission when banks have a presence across multiple markets.3
U.S. banks do not appear particularly ﬁckle in emerging markets, in con-
trast to some of the conclusions on international banks of Galindo, Micco,
and Powell (2004). Indeed, while our results support the view that foreign
banks can transmit international business cycles into host-country ﬁnan-
cial markets, this result is neither strong or robust. U.S. banks also may re-
duce the extent to which locally sourced real shocks and interest rates (i.e.,
local business cycles) are ampliﬁed by banking intermediaries. Conse-
quently, the U.S. banks engaged in this type of credit extension abroad may
reduce the highly procyclical credit cycles in some foreign markets.4
Section 5.2 of this paper discusses the U.S. bank foreign exposure data
and provides background on the extensive changes that have occurred
since 1986 in U.S. bank lending abroad and in the form and scale of their
exposures. Data on the relative importance of U.S. bank and other foreign
bank claims relative to GDP across European and Latin American coun-
tries provide context for the importance of this ﬁnancial activity. Section
5.3 econometrically explores the volatility of the panel data on U.S. bank
international claims. We contrast the cyclical properties of claims on in-
dustrialized countries in Europe versus on Latin American countries. Sec-
tion 5.4 discusses the implications of our results, on balance emphasizing
that foreign banks may contribute to aggregate stability in emerging mar-
kets.
5.2 Broad Patterns in U.S. Bank Foreign Exposures
The Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC)
Country Exposure Report (FFIEC 009) must be ﬁled by every U.S. char-
tered, insured, commercial bank in the United States, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions, or its
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3. See also Goldberg (2002), Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000), and Peek and Rosen-
gren (2000b).
4. Galindo, Micco, and Powell (2004) argue that foreign banks may be ﬁckle lenders in
times of local crisis, sharply reducing credit extension to local markets. We do not ﬁnd gen-
eral support for this argument in U.S. bank data.holding company, provided that the bank (or holding company) has, on a
fully consolidated bank basis, total outstanding claims on residents of for-
eign countries exceeding $30 million in aggregate. In these reports, bank
claims are itemized by country and separately encompass claims on banks,
public entities, and other recipients, including individuals and businesses.
In addition to direct international ﬂows, bank claims include the fair value
of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity, and other derivative
contracts. Banks provide some details on time remaining to maturity of
claims (one year and under, one to ﬁve years, and over ﬁve years) as well as
on direct claims versus ultimate risk claims. Other quarterly reports ﬁled by
banks contain information on bank total assets located in the United States
and abroad. Some reporting conventions have changed over time, but much
of this conﬁdential data has been consistently ﬁled by banks since 1986.
5.2.1 Foreign Claims Relative to Local Economies
Foreign lending can constitute a substantial fraction of claims in recipi-
ent countries. In this context, foreign claims are the sum of cross-border
claims and local claims denominated in both foreign and local currencies.
As shown in the ﬁrst data column of table 5.1 and indicated by values ex-
ceeding one, European countries often have total foreign claims in excess
of 100 percent of their GDP. This large fraction in part reﬂects volumes of
back-and-forth ﬁnancial ﬂows across borders, heavy use of banking-sector
ﬁnance, and the role of European ﬁnancial centers in intermediation of
some ﬂows. For Latin American countries, foreign claims represent a much
smaller share of GDP: across the region, the ratio of foreign claims to
country GDP is closer to 70 percent.
As shown in the second data column, the United States accounts for a
relatively small portion of the foreign claims on European countries, typi-
cally close to 6 percent overall. Intra-European ﬂows dominate the foreign
claims on European countries. By contrast, U.S. banks account for a large
portion of overall foreign claims on Latin American countries. There is
considerable cross-country variation in the share of the United States
within these foreign claims, from Costa Rica, at less than 20 percent of to-
tal foreign claims, to Mexico, where this ratio exceeds 95 percent.
5.2.2 Consolidation in U.S. Banks with Foreign Exposures
Industry consolidation, observed elsewhere across banking and ﬁnan-
cial services industries, is clearly evident in the changing number of banks
(or bank holding companies) with exposures to foreign markets. Figure 5.1
shows the number of U.S. banks that have ﬁled foreign exposure reports
each quarter since 1986. Starting from a high of 185 reporting banks in the
mid-1980s, the number of U.S. banks with foreign exposures declined to
140 by the mid-1990s and further declined to 75 banks by 2004.
As the number of banks declined, the size distribution of remaining
banks changed considerably over time. Figure 5.2 shows the share of re-
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Table 5.1 U.S. and other foreign bank claim shares in local economies, 2003
Ratio of total  Ratio of U.S.  Ratio of total 
foreign claims to  claims to total  U.S. claims to 
country GDP foreign claims country GDP
Europe 6.37 0.06 0.26
Austria 2.25 0.05 0.12
Belgium 3.87 0.06 0.22
Denmark 2.12 0.09 0.19
Finland 1.46 0.04 0.06
France 1.83 0.05 0.10
Germany 1.90 0.08 0.15
Greece 2.31 0.07 0.15
Iceland∗ 2.24 0.02 0.04
Ireland 8.45 0.03 0.24
Italy 1.85 0.05 0.09
Luxembourg 61.80 0.03 1.94
Netherlands 4.89 0.06 0.30
Norway∗ 1.36 0.11 0.14
Portugal 4.48 0.02 0.08
Spain 1.59 0.05 0.08
Sweden∗ 1.42 0.07 0.11
Switzerland 5.90 0.04 0.26
United Kingdom 4.97 0.08 0.40
Latin America 0.68 0.40 0.24
Argentina 0.84 0.28 0.24
Brazil 0.71 0.27 0.19
Chile 1.15 0.39 0.44
Colombia∗ 0.50 0.36 0.13
Costa Rica 0.84 0.18 0.15
Ecuador 0.30 0.27 0.08
Jamaica∗ 0.53 0.66 0.31
Mexico 0.41 0.97 0.40
Peru 0.32 0.40 0.13
Uruguay 1.02 0.43 0.44
Venezuela∗ 0.83 0.22 0.18
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for all reporting banks;
and BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for U.S.-owned bank claims.
Notes:2003 data, except where indicated by an asterisk. Venezuela data are 2002 for all ratios;
Sweden data are 2000 for total foreign claims ratios only; and Iceland, Norway, Colombia,
and Jamaica data are 2002 for total foreign claims ratios only. For this table we use the BIS
deﬁnition of foreign claims, meaning the sum of cross-border claims and local claims in both
foreign currency and domestic currency.
porting banks in ﬁve diﬀerent asset size ranges, contrasting size distribu-
tions for 1986:Q1 and 2004:Q1.5 In the 1980s banks were broadly distrib-
uted across small, medium, and large asset ranges. By 2004 the distribution
was more bimodal. Currently more than 30 percent of banks have assets
5. The ranges use 2003Q1 dollars as the base year.well under $1 billion, while more than 40 percent of banks have total assets
in excess of $10 billion.
As the total number of banks declined, so did the number of U.S. banks
with exposures across diﬀerent foreign regions. Among Europe, Canada,
Asia and the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Latin America has
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Fig. 5.1 Number of banks reporting exposure data 1986–2004
Fig. 5.2 Size distribution of U.S. banks reporting foreign exposuresthe most U.S. banks reporting exposure (sixty-six banks in mid-2004), with
similar numbers participating in European and Canadian markets. Asia
and the Middle East have ﬁfty-six banks, while about thirty U.S. banks
have some claims on Africa and other countries.
As a share of all banks reporting these foreign exposures, a similarly
large proportion of banks—over 90 percent—maintained positions in
Latin America, Canada, Europe, and Asia and the Middle East in the
1980s through the early part of the 1990s. As shown in ﬁgure 5.3, the 1990s
was a decade of increasing diﬀerentiation across U.S. banks in terms of
their regional exposures. While participation of U.S. banks in Canadian
and in Latin American markets remained high, participation rates in Asia
and the Middle East and Europe declined. By 2004, some of this diﬀeren-
tiation was reduced: participation in European markets recovered to over
80 percent of reporting banks, and the share of banks participating in
Latin American countries declined from highs observed prior to the Ar-
gentine crisis. During this period, the proportion of reporting banks with
Asia/Middle East exposure stayed at near 70 percent.
Very few banks have foreign exposures in only one region. The number
of banks exclusively focused on Latin America was three or four through
the 1980s, rising to eight sporadically in the early 1990s, and declining
again to a few specialty operations. Typically, between one and three banks
specialize in other regions, generally in claims on either Europe or Asia.
Banks with this sort of regional specialization are usually within the small-
est quartile of banks by asset size.
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Fig. 5.3 Percent of total reporting banks that report exposure to each region5.2.3 Magnitudes of U.S. Bank Foreign Claims
The trend toward consolidation in the banking sector has not led to a de-
cline in the total foreign exposures across U.S. banks. The increasing val-
ues over past decades of total foreign exposure of U.S. banks (in 2003 dol-
lars) are depicted in ﬁgure 5.4 for cross-border claims and ﬁgure 5.5 for
local claims. After sharp declines over the late 1980s, U.S. bank foreign ex-
posures had persistent expansion from 1993 through 2004. This growth oc-
curred both in total cross-border claims and in total local claims, even
when evaluated relative to the growth in total assets of U.S. banks report-
ing foreign exposures.
These observations are drawn from data aggregated across all U.S. banks
reporting foreign exposures. Next, we instead utilize the source data, at the
level of individual reporting banks, and construct bank-speciﬁc measures
of foreign exposure–to-asset position. We then average this foreign expo-
sure ratio across all individual reporting banks. The resulting averages,
shown in ﬁgure 5.6, are unweighted by bank size and therefore place
greater (relative) weight on the exposures of smaller banks. Trend increases
in average foreign exposure ratios occurred through late 1998, driven
strongly by growth in U.S. average ratios of bank claims on Latin America.
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Fig. 5.4 Total value of U.S. bank cross-border claims, by regionFig. 5.5 Total value of U.S. bank local claims, by region
Fig. 5.6 Average bank-speciﬁc ratios of regional foreign exposure to bank 
total assetsThese average claims on Latin American counterparties ﬂuctuated sub-
stantially through 2000 before sharply declining between mid-2001 and
2004 when our data end. These ratios shown in ﬁgure 5.6 contrast sharply
with patterns in total ﬂows from all U.S. banks reporting foreign exposures.
The diﬀerence demonstrates that smaller U.S. banks with foreign expo-
sures both had higher-than-average exposures to Latin America and re-
duced these exposures (relative to their asset bases) more dramatically than
their larger bank counterparts.
Our examination of U.S. bank exposure data leads to more nuanced con-
clusions than some other studies of international capital ﬂows that argue
that the 1999 to 2000 credit crunch was common throughout Latin Amer-
ica. Braun and Hausmann (2002), for example, using data through 2001,
ﬁnd that bank credit in many Latin American countries collapsed in the af-
termath of the Asian and especially the Russian crises. The strong rates of
real credit growth, sometimes described as credit booms, that character-
ized the early and mid-1990s generally decreased since 1998 and stayed at
lower levels through 2001. We ﬁnd that this type of credit crunch in claims
on Latin American countries was more a feature of the cross-border ﬂows
than of the local claims of U.S.-owned banks. Moreover, this credit crunch
seems to better describe banks other than the largest U.S. banks with for-
eign exposures to countries in the region. This interesting set of observa-
tions may be relevant for discussions of overall banking-sector stability.
Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) argue that the mix of foreign versus
domestically owned banks within Latin America was important for the
growth rates and stability of credit ﬂows: credit growth and credit stability
were enhanced when strong foreign partners were participating in local
markets. Here we conﬁrm this ﬁnding, and extend it with the observation
that the size as well as the form of foreign bank claims on a market also may
matter for sustained intermediation by the banking sector.
5.2.4 The Composition of U.S. Bank Foreign Clients
The exposure data show the relative importance of banks, public-sector
borrowers, and all other borrowers in U.S. bank cross-border claims on
each country. Figures 5.7 and 5.8show these broad details for cross-border
claims on Europe and Latin America, respectively. In U.S. bank cross-
border claims on Europe, the share of public-sector borrowers was in the
area of 10 percent since the 1980s, rising as high as 14 percent in the early
1990s and again in 1998, but recently falling to below 7 percent. Other
private-sector borrowers became increasing active in total cross-border
claims on Europeans over the past two decades, ultimately rising to be
comparable in size to bank borrowers.
U.S. bank cross-border claims on Latin American counterparties were
also characterized by a declining relative importance of bank-to-bank
lending. Even more dramatic were the reductions in the share of cross-
212 Linda S. GoldbergFig. 5.7 Breakdown of European cross-border claims by client
Fig. 5.8 Breakdown of Latin American cross-border claims by clientborder claims accounted for by the public sector, moving from 40 percent
in the late 1980s to under 10 percent in 2004. The share accounted for by
nonbank private borrowers has continued to rise over past decades, reach-
ing almost 60 percent in 2003 and 2004. By 1999 private nonbank activity
displaced bank-to-bank lending as the primary client in U.S. bank cross-
border claims on Latin American customers.
5.3 U.S. Bank Foreign Exposures and Business-Cycle Transmission
International banks entering into local markets can potentially change
the transmission of international shocks to local markets (Peek and
Rosengren 1997, 2000a) and spur contagion across markets (Van Rijck-
eghem and Weder 2001). These banks can also have diﬀerent risk manage-
ment systems and sources of funds, raising the prospect that they may
change the typically procyclical response of the host-country banking sys-
tem to local shocks. In this section we provide evidence relevant for the de-
bate on shock transmission by exploring the sensitivity of U.S. bank for-
eign exposures to local country and U.S. business-cycle variables. In order
to have a benchmark for comparison, we contrast the patterns in U.S. bank
claims on European countries with the patterns in U.S. bank claims on
Latin American countries. Delving further into this issue, we ask whether
larger banks—here taken to be the ﬁve largest money center banks—are
more stable in credit extension and diﬀer from smaller banks in the sensi-
tivity of this credit to business-cycle variables.6 Some of the analysis uses
aggregated claims across banks, while other parts of our analysis exploit
the rich time series panel nature of the bank exposure data.7
5.3.1 Exposures to European and Latin American Countries
Europe accounts for 40 percent of total U.S. bank foreign exposures
(table 5.2), with U.S. bank cross-border claims three times as large as U.S.
bank local claims (i.e., claims extended by their branches and subsidiaries
abroad). The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands ac-
count for most of the U.S. bank claims on Europe. Latin American coun-
214 Linda S. Goldberg
6. The top ﬁve money center banks are Bank of America Corp., Bank One Corp., Taunus
Corp., JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Citigroup. Taunus is the U.S. holding company subsidiary
of Deutsche Bank. These banks are formed in part by smaller banks that consolidated. Thus,
for each of these ﬁve large money center banks we create a synthetic construct going back in
time that includes the exposures of smaller banks that eventually merged together into the cur-
rent ﬁve money center banks. This approach may impart a survivorship bias to the empirical
results that follow. Note that Taunus is not domestically owned. An alternative group of large
banks could be geared toward large domestic lenders and be broader. Such a grouping could
include Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase and Co., Wells Fargo and
Co., Wachovia Corp., Bank One Corp., U.S. Bancorp, National City Corp., and Suntrust
Banks, Inc.
7. See also recent work by Santor (2004) applying portfolio theory to Canadian bank ex-
posure data.tries account for less than 8 percent of the total foreign exposures of U.S.
banks. In contrast to the pattern vis-à-vis Europe, where cross-border
claims dominate, U.S. bank exposures to Latin American countries now
occur more through local claims, by a ratio of nearly two to one. Looking
across countries, the largest U.S. banks with foreign exposures typically
dominate local claims more than they dominate cross-border claims. In
some Latin American countries, most notably Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Jamaica, and Uruguay, smaller U.S. banks account for more of the cross-
border claims than do the larger U.S. banks (appendix table 1).
To gain perspective on the ﬂuctuations in diﬀerent types of U.S. bank
foreign exposures, we construct volatility measures by country and across
types of claims (cross border, local). “Volatility” is the standard deviation
of these claims on each country (summed across banks), normalized by the
associated mean U.S. bank claims on that country. As shown in table 5.3,
the volatility of cross-border claims in recent data (2000:Q1 through
2004:Q2) is similar for Europe and Latin American regions.8 Iceland and
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Table 5.2 Foreign exposure of U.S. reporting banks, 2004:Q1 (country share in total U.S. bank
foreign exposures)
Cross-border Local  Cross-border Local 
claims claims Total claims claims Total
Europe 25.55 8.91 39.98 Latin America 2.77 4.69 7.57
Austria 0.39 0.01 0.47 Argentina 0.19 0.22 0.42
Belgium 0.78 0.26 1.15 Brazil 0.67 0.82 1.54
Denmark 0.64 0.01 0.70 Chile 0.21 0.34 0.57
Finland 0.23 0.00 0.27 Colombia 0.08 0.07 0.15
France 2.72 0.11 3.35 Costa Rica 0.04 0.01 0.04
Germany 4.62 1.58 7.23 Ecuador 0.02 0.01 0.03
Greece 0.15 0.17 0.37 Jamaica 0.03 0.02 0.05
Iceland 0.00 0.00 0.00 Mexico 1.32 3.06 4.41
Ireland 0.47 0.07 0.65 Peru 0.04 0.07 0.12
Italy 1.63 0.42 2.58 Uruguay 0.04 0.04 0.08
Luxembourg 0.57 0.07 0.86 Venezuela 0.13 0.03 0.16
The Netherlands 2.45 0.02 2.93
Norway 0.49 0.02 0.57
Portugal 0.09 0.04 0.17
Spain 0.75 0.40 1.29
Sweden 0.56 0.04 0.66
Switzerland 1.12 0.12 1.62
United Kingdom 7.89 5.57 15.10
Note: The total exposure column includes derivative positions, and typically exceeds the sum of cross-
border and local claims.
8. This time frame both captures the dynamics surrounding the Argentine crisis and has the
technical advantage of minimizing the adjustments to account for bank mergers needed as 
the analysis goes further back in time.Argentina had similar and particularly high coeﬃcients of variation in the
cross-border claims. While the average variation in local claims appears
higher for countries in Latin America compared with Europe, this obser-
vation masks the high volatility of claims on some individual European
countries with relatively small volumes of such claims. Finally, abstracting
from Mexico, where local claim volatility is driven by recent purchases of
Mexican banks, and Argentina, which was in crisis during part of this pe-
riod, local claims issued by U.S. banks have tended to be more stable than
cross-border claims in most Latin American countries.
The next pair of tables compares patterns in the foreign claims of larger
versus smaller U.S. banks reporting foreign exposures. For these calcula-
tions, we sum across the claims of larger U.S. reporting banks (ﬁve money
center) vis-à-vis individual countries and compare these sums with simi-
lar constructs using data summed across all other banks reporting foreign
exposures. We compute the relative coeﬃcients of variation across large
versus smaller banks for a speciﬁc type of claim and for a speciﬁc country
or region. In the results reported in each cell of table 5.4 a value greater
than 1 can be interpreted as showing that claims extended by larger U.S.
banks were relatively more volatile than claims extended by smaller U.S.
banks. Analogously, a cell value less than 1 implies relatively less volatil-
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Table 5.3 Volatility of foreign exposures of U.S. banks
Cross-border Local  Cross-border Local 
claims claims Total claims claims Total
Europe 0.15 0.11 0.13 Latin America 0.17 0.23 0.15
Austria 0.22 1.11 0.19 Argentina 0.51 0.62 0.57
Belgium 0.20 0.17 0.16 Brazil 0.21 0.19 0.19
Denmark 0.18 0.47 0.17 Chile 0.15 0.06 0.06
Finland 0.27 1.16 0.23 Columbia 0.31 0.17 0.25
France 0.24 0.38 0.15 Costa Rica 0.11 0.26 0.09
Germany 0.15 0.14 0.10 Ecuador 0.25 0.44 0.15
Greece 0.18 0.34 0.21 Jamaica 0.15 0.14 0.11
Iceland 0.54 3.74 0.51 Mexico 0.11 0.54 0.37
Ireland 0.32 0.20 0.25 Peru 0.35 0.08 0.17
Italy 0.16 0.13 0.10 Uruguay 0.35 0.32 0.31
Luxembourg 0.32 0.37 0.29 Venezuela 0.20 0.34 0.21
The Netherlands 0.16 0.46 0.14
Norway 0.30 0.22 0.27
Portugal 0.16 0.49 0.16
Spain 0.22 0.09 0.10
Sweden 0.16 0.35 0.11
Switzerland 0.25 0.15 0.20
United Kingdom 0.25 0.14 0.19
Notes: Standard deviation of total U.S. bank foreign exposures in each category (cross-border claims,
local claims, or total claims) divided by the average value of those foreign exposures. Data used for
2000:Q1–2004:Q2, in 2003:Q1 millions of U.S. dollars.ity in the foreign exposures of the larger U.S. banks vis-à-vis a particular
country.
The preponderance of cells with values less than 1 in the leftmost panel
of table 5.4 suggests that, on average, the cross-border and local claims on
European countries by larger U.S. banks are less volatile than the claims
extended by smaller U.S. banks. There is clearly country-speciﬁc variation,
with larger U.S. banks having higher volatility of claims than smaller U.S.
banks in their transactions with ﬁnancial centers such as Switzerland and
the United Kingdom. Diﬀerences across larger and smaller U.S. banks are
most pronounced in local claims in both European countries and Latin
American countries (right panel): the claims by larger banks tend to be
substantially less volatile than the claims by smaller banks. Evidence on
cross-border claims to Latin American countries is mixed. For Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica, cross-border claims from larger banks clearly
were more stable, contrasting with patterns for Colombia, Ecuador, Mex-
ico, and Uruguay.
5.3.2 Foreign Exposures of U.S. Banks and Business Cycles
As another window into the volatility of U.S. bank foreign exposures, we
conduct regression analysis starting from a model of a bank’s exposure to
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Table 5.4 Relative volatility of U.S. bank foreign exposures: Top ﬁve U.S. banks and other 
U.S. reporting banks compared, 2000:Q1–2004:Q2
Cross-border Local  Cross-border Local 
claims claims Total claims claims Total
Europe 0.84 0.38 0.60 Latin America 1.30 0.42 0.96
Austria 1.17 0.46 0.97 Argentina 0.79 0.52 0.88
Belgium 0.67 0.05 0.42 Brazil 0.82 0.12 0.60
Denmark 1.34 2.24 1.17 Chile 0.66 0.09 0.33
Finland 0.83 0.22 0.63 Colombia 2.69 2.05
France 1.44 0.64 0.58 Costa Rica 1.01 0.09 0.97
Germany 0.57 0.28 0.35 Ecuador 4.03 2.11
Greece 0.86 0.08 0.98 Jamaica 0.56 0.44
Iceland 0.55 1.03 0.53 Mexico 1.80 1.54 4.08
Ireland 0.93 0.74 0.64 Peru 1.14 0.48
Italy 0.66 0.06 0.52 Uruguay 2.77 0.47 1.53
Luxembourg 0.24 0.31 0.26 Venezuela 3.89 3.77
The Netherlands 0.59 0.67 0.45
Norway 1.31 5.28 1.45
Portugal 0.96 0.90
Spain 0.56 0.06 0.22
Sweden 0.35 1.09 0.34
Switzerland 2.14 0.23 0.78
United Kingdom 1.65 0.53 1.04
Note: Mexican local claims appear more volatile due to acquisition events during this interval.any country as dependent on local business-cycle variables (real local in-
terest rates, it
c, and real GDP growth rates, GGDPt
c) and U.S. business-
cycle variables (U.S. real interest rates, it
US, and U.S. real GDP growth,
GGDPt
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plus a random error term. In this speciﬁcation the terms ai
0 and ai
1t allow
for bank-speciﬁc variation in mean and trend growth in their foreign ex-
posures. The terms arand ar
2tintroduce region-speciﬁc variation and allow
for the possibility that, regardless of the role of other observable funda-
mentals, some regions are more popular destinations for U.S. bank foreign
exposures.
To reduce estimation problems arising from unit root properties of GDP
growth, real interest rates, and U.S. bank external exposures, we ﬁrst-
diﬀerence equation (1). The bank and region constant terms drop out,
leaving equation (2) speciﬁed in log-diﬀerences with bank-speciﬁc and
region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to capture trends in claims on speciﬁc countries
(and with a random error term assumed).
(2)  Expt
ic   ai
1   ar
2   b    it
c   c    it
US   d    GGDPt
c   e    GGDPt
US
This basic testing speciﬁcation states that the percentage change in a
U.S. bank’s claims on any country has the following: a bank-speciﬁc com-
ponent common across all regions, a region-speciﬁc component shared by
banks, components correlated with changes in foreign and U.S. real inter-
est rates, and components correlated with changes in foreign and U.S.
GDP growth rates. Regression speciﬁcations are run over quarterly data
for the period 1986:Q1 to 2004:Q2 using percent changes in the bank ex-
posures against changes in interest rates and against percent changes in
real GDP growth rates.
As detailed in table 5.5, we performed many variations on this basic
speciﬁcation. Many regression results were starkly diﬀerent for the full
data period compared with a sample break at 2001:Q2. To capture the ﬂa-
vor of these changes, we present the earlier and latter results for contrast,
fully aware of the limitations of using a small number of quarters in the lat-
ter period. Some regressions use data on claims aggregated across U.S.
banks. Other regressions take greater advantage of the rich data of indi-
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9. The data used for real local interest rates are, in general, country lending rates (Interna-
tional Financial Statistics [IFS] 60p), “the lending rate to meet the short and medium term ﬁ-
nancing needs of the private sector, diﬀerentiated by credit worthiness of borrowers and ob-
jectives of ﬁnancing.” If this rate is unavailable for a country, we use deposit rates (IFS 60l) or
Treasury bill rates (IFS 60c). See the data appendix.vidual bank exposures, alternatively applying ﬁxed eﬀects estimators or
random eﬀects estimators to time-series panels. Hausmann tests favor the
random coeﬃcients model over ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. Other speciﬁca-
tions compare the growth in U.S. bank foreign exposures across “crisis”
versus “normal” periods.10 We have run the regression speciﬁcation with
and without regional trend terms, with diﬀerent intervals speciﬁed, and
with cross-border claims aggregated across all reporting banks, disaggre-
gated to larger versus smaller reporting banks, and as robustness checks,
containing adjustments for the ultimate counterparty on transactions in-
stead of just direct counterparties and excluding either U.S. GDP or U.S.
interest rates from the regressions. Only a subset of our ﬁndings is reported
in the tables of this section. Distinctions in the results generated across
speciﬁcations are discussed if these are statistically or economically im-
portant.
Regression Results
Table 5.6 presents regression results using aggregates across all U.S.
banks in their foreign exposures to individual countries. Panel A presents
ﬁndings for cross-border claims. Panel B presents ﬁndings for the local
claims of U.S. banks. There are eighteen European countries and eleven
Latin American countries represented in each data quarter. Panel A shows
that macroeconomic variables are signiﬁcant drivers of U.S. bank cross-
border claims on European countries. More speciﬁcally, these claims ex-
hibit procyclicality vis-à-vis U.S. GDP growth and negative correlations
with destination market interest rates (as indicated by boldface type).
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Table 5.5 Estimation intervals, data types, and parameter stability tests
Sample periods Types of foreign exposure Parameter tests
1986:Q1 through 2004:Q2 Total foreign exposure Equality across types of banks (ﬁve money 
center vs. all others)
1986:Q1 through 2001:Q2 Cross-border claims Equality across destination markets 
(European vs. Latin American countries)
2001:Q3 through 2004:Q2 Local claims Latin American Sample, with and without 
Mexico included
Equality across by bank type and 
destination market
Random eﬀects estimators versus ﬁxed 
eﬀects estimators
Claims aggregated across banks, versus 
disaggregated by bank
10. For these regressions, crisis dates include the following: the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) crisis, 1992:Q3–1993:Q1; Tequila crisis, 1994:Q4–1995:Q1; Asia crisis, 1997:Q3–
1997:Q4; Russian default, 1998:Q3–1998:Q4; and Argentine crisis dated here at 2001:Q4–
2002:Q1.Table 5.6 Regressions on U.S. bank foreign exposures, with exposures aggregated across all
U.S. reporting banks
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
A. Elasticities of response of cross-border claims
1986:Q1–2001:Q2
European countries 1.02 0.00 2.6∗∗ –1.27∗∗∗ –0.60
(0.94) (0.24) (1.16) (0.43) (1.14)
0.02 3.50∗∗∗ –1.27∗∗∗ –0.88
(0.24) (0.82) (0.43) (1.11)
Latin American countries –2.11 0.10 2.08 0.00 –1.41
(1.30) (0.19) (1.61) (0.00) (1.58)
0.08 0.19 0.00 –0.86
(0.19) (1.12) (0.00) (1.54)
2001:Q2–2004:Q2
European countries 5.12∗∗ 1.27∗∗ –0.79 –1.13 2.42
(2.18) (0.59) (2.41) (1.87) (2.22)
1.35∗∗ 3.42∗∗ –0.43 0.40
(0.59) (1.61) (1.86) (2.06)
Latin American countries –2.83 0.20 0.66 0.08 3.90
(3.07) (0.4) (3.41) (0.31) (2.95)
0.14 –1.64 0.06 4.89∗
(0.40) (2.34) (0.31) (2.77)
B. Elasticities of response of local claims
1986:Q1–2001:Q2
European countries 7.82 –0.93 9.81 2.49 5.93
(4.9) (1.32) (6.03) (2.45) (6.0)
–0.61 16.55∗∗∗ 2.51 3.83
(1.31) (4.31) (2.45) (5.86)
Latin American countries 10.77 –1.05 1.50 0.00 3.55
(6.73) (0.98) (8.35) (0.00) (8.11)
–0.91 11.24∗∗ 0.00 0.81
(0.98) (5.72) (0.00) (7.94)
2001:Q2–2004:Q2
European countries 11.7 0.22 –4.77 4.03 –13.46
(9.31) (2.52) (10.26) (8.33) (9.71)
0.46 4.84 6.34 –18.46∗∗
(2.51) (6.83) (8.12) (8.85)
Latin American countries 7.48 –1.01 –6.54 –0.34 5.72
(12.7) (1.66) (14.11) (1.28) (12.21)
–0.85 –0.46 –0.27 3.12
(1.64) (9.62) (1.27) (11.39)
Notes:In panel A, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2 period, observations  1,492, adjusted R2 0.012, adjusted R2(no
trend)   0.015; in 2001:Q2–2004:Q2 period, observations   309, adjusted R2  0.039, adjusted R2 (no
trend)   0.031. In panel B, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2 period, observations   1425, adjusted R2   –0.001, ad-
justed R2 (no trend)   0.009; in 2001:Q2–2004:Q2 period, observations 299, adjusted R2   –0.015, ad-
justed R2 (no trend)   –0.005.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.However, these cyclical forces have low explanatory power for the overall
regression analysis, and they are particularly weak as determinants of the
pattern of cross-border ﬂows from U.S. banks to their Latin American
counterparties.
In panel B of table 5.6, regression results for U.S. bank local claims on
European and Latin American countries also show very low overall ex-
planatory power of these macroeconomic forces. Additionally, the esti-
mated relationships are not robust over time. Local claims of U.S. banks
were procyclical with U.S. GDP in the data extending through 2000 or 2001
(as in Goldberg 2002), but these procyclical patterns are not sustained in
2001 through 2004.
In other regression speciﬁcations we explore whether these cyclical
forces play diﬀerent roles in the foreign exposures of larger U.S. banks ver-
sus smaller U.S. banks. Recall that claims from larger U.S. reporting banks
tend to be less volatile than claims from smaller U.S. banks, and local
claims tend to be more stable than cross-border ﬂows. Tables 5.7 and 5.8
explore this theme for cross-border claims and local claims, respectively,
using ordinary least squares regressions. As in the prior sections, the ag-
gregate called “larger banks” is the sum of foreign exposures across ﬁve
money center banks. The aggregate called “smaller banks” consists of the
sum across all other banks of claims on each country at each date.11 In
these regressions the isuperscript from equation (2) covers two aggregates,
larger and smaller banks, while the regional superscript distinguishes be-
tween the regional location of the twenty-nine countries in the regression
each quarter and spanning European and Latin American countries.
The relationships between business cycle variables and U.S. bank foreign
exposures appear unstable over time and diﬀerentiated by region. U.S.
bank claims on Europe exhibit positive growth in the cross-border and lo-
cal claim components, with this growth alternatively attributable to trend
or to U.S. GDP cyclical transmission. Cyclical transmission to European
countries, to the extent to which it is present, is more robustly a feature of
larger bank lending. Other cyclical variables do not enter these regressions
with consistent signs or signiﬁcance ranges. Larger U.S. banks had robust
trend growth in local claims on Latin American countries across the diﬀer-
ent subperiods of our sample, including in the period following the Argen-
tine crisis. These trends likely reﬂect strategic expansions by the U.S. banks
that entered local markets by setting up branches and subsidiaries. Quar-
terly cyclical fundamental variables explain very little of the patterns of
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11. Appendix tables 2 and 3 explore similar concepts but individually introduce individual
bank claims on individual countries in the regressions, instead of claims aggregated by type
of bank. While we report speciﬁcations using random eﬀects estimators, we also have per-
formed ﬁxed eﬀect regressions, with ﬁxed eﬀects deﬁned over individual banks, yielding sim-
ilar results. The random eﬀects estimators provide a better description of the trend diﬀerences
across banks in their claims on diﬀerent regions.Table 5.7 Regressions on U.S. bank cross-border claims, sum across larger banks and sum
across smaller banks
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
A. Elasticities of response of cross-border claims, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2
On Europe, smaller banks 5.52∗∗∗ 0.04 –1.19 –0.95∗ –0.98
(1.27) (0.33) (1.57) (0.58) (1.54)
0.22 3.62∗∗∗ –0.93 –2.45∗
(0.33) (1.11) (0.58) (1.51)
On Latin America,  –1.44 0.20 1.50 0.00 0.96
smaller banks (1.75) (0.25) (2.17) (0.00) (2.13)
0.18 0.20 0.00 1.34
(0.25) (1.51) (0.00) (2.09)
On Europe, larger banks 0.94 0.17 3.62∗∗ –0.92 0.36
(1.26) (0.33) (1.56) (0.58) (1.54)
0.20 4.45∗∗∗ –0.91 0.11
(0.33) (1.10) (0.58) (1.51)
On Latin America,  9.28∗∗ –0.20 –5.05 –0.99 –5.44
larger banks (3.77) (0.83) (4.67) (1.31) (4.59)
0.10 3.04 –0.95 –7.93∗
(0.83) (3.28) (1.31) (4.49)
B. Elasticities of response of cross-border claims, 2001:Q2–2004:Q3
On Europe, smaller banks 3.04 1.27∗ 4.67 –0.71 4.19
(2.85) (0.77) (3.13) (2.44) (2.89)
1.32∗ 7.17∗∗∗ –0.29 2.99
(0.77) (2.09) (2.42) (2.68)
On Latin America, –0.80 0.77 –0.71 –0.12 1.72
smaller banks (4.00) (0.52) (4.44) (0.40) (3.84)
0.75 –1.36 –0.13 2.00
(0.52) (3.05) (0.40) (3.61)
On Europe, larger banks 9.01∗∗∗ 0.92 –3.52 –0.58 3.83
(2.85) (0.77) (3.13) (2.44) (2.89)
1.06 3.89∗ 0.65 0.26
(0.77) (2.09) (2.42) (2.68)
On Latin America,  –3.61 0.77 12.69 –0.65 7.78
larger banks (8.52) (1.87) (9.42) (5.48) (8.46)
0.71 9.72 –1.06 9.18
(1.88) (6.37) (5.44) (7.88)
Notes: In panel A, observations   2,985, adjusted R2   0.007, adjusted R2 (no trend)   0.009; In panel
B, observations   618, adjusted R2   0.023, adjusted R2 (no trend)   0.024.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 5.8 Regressions on U.S. bank local claims, sum across larger banks and sum across
smaller banks
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
A. Elasticities of response of local claims, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2
On Europe, smaller banks 52.29∗∗∗ –3.76 –34.94∗∗ 6.95 33.74∗∗
(12.91) (4.32) (15.9) (9.37) (15.64)
–1.04 9.64 7.06 17.51
(4.28) (11.52) (9.4) (15.17)
On Latin America,  0.10 –6.06 43.17∗ 0.00∗∗ –37.30
smaller banks (19.73) (4.3) (24.6) (0.00) (22.45)
–6.06 43.27∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ –37.32
(4.28) (16.7) (0.00) (22.16)
On Europe, larger banks 7.98 –0.70 10.39 2.38 5.87
(8.88) (2.40) (10.93) (4.44) (10.88)
–0.37 17.26∗∗ 2.39 3.73
(2.38) (7.84) (4.46) (10.65)
On Latin America,  107.3∗∗∗ –1.82 –121.97∗∗∗ 11.53 102.4∗∗
larger banks (35.83) (10.11) (44.34) (19.27) (42.63)
3.44 –29.95 11.72 69.34
(10.03) (31.31) (19.33) (41.64)
B. Elasticities of response of local claims, 2001:Q2–2004:Q3
On Europe, smaller banks 121.64∗∗∗ 8.23 –84.32∗∗ 10.75 –22.61
(33.56) (8.38) (37.2) (27.93) (34.99)
9.84 16.94 33.8 –75.07∗∗
(8.45) (24.79) (27.46) (32.17)
On Latin America,  –23.44 –1.28 7.41 0.21 12.72
smaller banks (74.78) (14.69) (97.29) (4.64) (78.11)
–1.72 –12.56 0.01 20.32
(14.77) (74.25) (4.65) (74.99)
On Europe, larger banks 8.39 –1.90 0.79 –1.12 –7.20
(30.67) (8.24) (33.67) (27.25) (31.78)
–1.73 7.68 0.47 –10.78
(8.3) (22.56) (26.88) (29.25)
On Latin America,  266.7∗∗ 18.60 –184.08 22.05 –44.69
larger banks (112.98) (24.39) (135.15) (62.47) (116.65)
22.26 38.32 66.83 –156.53
(24.55) (97.42) (61.48) (109.7)
Notes: In panel A, observations   2,079, adjusted R2   0.003, adjusted R2 (no trend)   0.004; in panel
B, observations   490, adjusted R2   –0.006, adjusted R2 (no trend)   –0.014.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.foreign exposure expansions in recent years. While cross-border claims
have a greater tendency toward comovement with the U.S. cycle, this pat-
tern is not robust across larger and smaller U.S. banks, and we do not ob-
serve stable rates of transmission of U.S. or destination market cycles in
cross-border or local claims.
As further robustness checks, we consider whether simultaneously in-
cluding U.S. real GDP and U.S. real interest rates in speciﬁcations biases
each individual term toward insigniﬁcance. Such misspeciﬁcation might
arise, for example, because U.S. real interest rates are endogenous to the
business cycle, following a policy reaction function, or because interest
rates play a role in investment growth, a key component of GDP ﬂuctua-
tions. Alternative regression speciﬁcations using either but not both of the
country fundamentals (not shown) do not qualitatively change our con-
clusions. Likewise, our qualitative ﬁndings are robust to the choice of
diﬀerent break point dates post-2000:Q1 and are robust across regression
speciﬁcations using individual bank data instead of data aggregated across
groups of banks.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored recent patterns in the international exposures of
U.S. banks. Despite continued consolidation in the ﬁnancial services in-
dustry, reﬂected in the sharply reduced total number of U.S. banks with
foreign exposures, the total foreign exposure of these banks has continued
to grow. U.S. bank claims represent a large fraction of foreign claims on
Latin American countries, as well as being large relative to local GDP. This
role is stronger than in individual European countries, where other Euro-
pean banks tend to dominate foreign claims. Public-sector recipients of
these claims account for less than 10 percent of the total cross-border
claims on European countries, consistent with how bank lending has been
allocated in Europe in recent decades. While a similar ratio now applies for
Latin American countries, this represents a sharp departure from alloca-
tions in the early 1990s, when the public debt share exceeded 30 percent of
U.S. bank claims on the region.
The largest U.S. banks increasingly dominate the total volumes of for-
eign transactions of U.S. banks, with the composition of transactions
evolving diﬀerently for larger banks than smaller banks involved in foreign
exposures. Cross-border claims have soared with respect to European
counterparts but more recently have been ﬂat or declining in the Latin
American region. Instead of representing declines in the related foreign ex-
posures of larger U.S. banks, these cross-border claims have been replaced
by claims from U.S. bank branches and subsidiaries located in Latin Amer-
ican markets. Such local claims soared after 1997 and later stabilized at
high levels, even in the aftermath of the Argentine crisis. Postcrisis declines
224 Linda S. Goldbergin U.S. bank positions in Latin America were more heavily concentrated
among the smaller U.S. banks with foreign exposures. Smaller banks’ po-
sitions have been concentrated in cross-border claims, with these claims ex-
hibiting slower and more volatile overall credit growth than claims ema-
nating from the largest banks.
The ﬁnal empirical section of the paper uses data on individual U.S.
bank foreign exposures to investigate the claim that such banks may be
highly cyclical lenders and transmit foreign shocks to local markets. We
ﬁnd evidence of procyclical cross-border ﬂows from U.S. banks to Euro-
pean markets. However, U.S. bank claims on Latin American countries
tend to have weak and unstable relationships with both U.S. business-cycle
variables and local business variables. We do not present a structural
model of portfolio theory as a determinant of the behavior of U.S. banks
in selecting markets for extending claims and for determining quantities of
these claims. However, our regression results do not bode well for such an
application, especially if the application will rely on U.S. and counterpart
country GDP growth rates and interest rates.
Overall, we ﬁnd that cyclical variables explain very little of the move-
ments observed in cross-border claims or the growth in local claims. The
evidence certainly does not support strong U.S. business-cycle transmis-
sion. Indeed, the lack of importance of local business-cycle variables as de-
terminants of U.S. bank foreign exposures may have direct policy rele-
vance. These claims of foreign banks may dampen the strong procyclicality
of overall credit issuance by local ﬁnancial systems, ultimately reducing the
amplitude of local cycles. This hypothesis is worth future investigation.
U.S. banks, and in particular the larger U.S. banks that have been heavily
involved in local claims, may play a role in stabilizing the business cycles of




U.S. FFIEC 009 and 009a reports are ﬁled quarterly by all U.S. banks
with signiﬁcant exposures.
Background
The FFIEC report was initiated in 1977 as the Federal Reserve (FR)
2036 report and was used to collect data on the distribution, by country, of
claims on foreigners held by U.S. banks and bank holding companies. The
The International Exposure of U.S. Banks 225FDIC and OCC collected similar information from institutions under
their supervision. In March 1984, the FR 2036 became an FFIEC report
and was renumbered FFIEC 009. It was revised in March 1986 to provide
more detail on guaranteed claims. In 1995, the report was revised to add a
schedule for the fair value of derivative contracts, and several items were
combined.
Respondent Panel
The panel consists of U.S. commercial banks and bank holding compa-
nies holding $30 million or more in claims on residents of foreign coun-
tries. Respondents ﬁle the FFIEC 009a if exposures to a country exceed 1
percent of total assets or 20 percent of capital of the reporting institution.
FFIEC 009a respondents also furnish a list of countries in which exposures
were between .75 percent and 1 percent of total assets or between 15 and
20 percent of capital. Participation is required.
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Table 5A.1 Data sources
Countries Source Type Currency
GDP
All but those below IFS Nominal Millions of local currency
The Euro-zone countries, Denmark,  OECD Nominal Millions of local currency
Iceland
Jamaica (1986) IFS Real Millions of local currency
Argentina (1993), Brazil (1990),  INTL Real Millions of local currency
Chile (1996), Colombia (1994), 
Ecuador (1975)
Venezuela INTL Nominal Millions of local currency
Interest rates
All other countries IFS Lending rate (60p)
Money market rate
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Spain IFS (60b)
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Greece IFS Deposit rate (60l)
Sweden IFS Repurchase rate (60a)
Government long-term
Austria, Luxembourg EuroStat Interest rate
Government long-term
Portugal OECD Interest rate
CPI
All countries IFSAppendix B
Table 5B.1 Value of foreign exposures of ﬁve money center banks relative to the value of foreign
exposures of all other U.S. banks, 2004:Q1
Cross-border Local  Cross-border Local 
claims claims Total claims claims Total
Europe 4.2 3.1 4.1 Latin America 3.3 233.6 10.2
Austria 0.9 1.3 Argentina 5.7 13.5
Belgium 1.3 322.8 2.3 Brazil 2.8 7.6
Denmark 0.8 5.5 1.0 Chile 1.8 6.3
Finland 10.7 12.20 11.7 Colombia 3.8 8.2
France 6.9 7.4 5.8 Costa Rica 0.7 1.0
Germany 4.4 379.2 6.2 Ecuador 0.4 1.2
Greece 8.7 22.8 Jamaica 0.9 1.9
0.7 1.2 Mexico 5.0 160.8 17.5
Ireland 1.9 0.9 2.0 Peru 2.8 9.6
Italy 19.2 313.9 22.2 Uruguay 0.7 37.2 2.2
Luxembourg 32.4 4.5 25.3 Venezuela 1.9 2.5
The Netherlands 5.1 14.6 5.0
Norway 10.7 2.4 10.5
Portugal 2.1 4.5
Spain 10.8 42.3 14.9
Sweden 2.4 9.7 2.7
Switzerland 5.7 174.4 5.0
United Kingdom 3.6 1.7 2.8Appendix C
Regressions Using Individual U.S. Bank Data 
(Bank-Speciﬁc Random Eﬀects, 
Maximum-Likelihood Estimation)
Table 5C.1 Elasticities of response of cross-border claims, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
On Europe, smaller banks 46.02∗∗∗ 0.79 7.32 2.78 0.25
(4.52) (1.09) (4.64) (1.99) (4.49)
1.72 27.75∗∗∗ 2.94 –6.37
(1.09) (4.15) (1.99) (4.44)
On Latin America,  11.21∗∗∗ 0.37 –0.08 0.00∗∗ –6.87
smaller banks (4.71) (0.6) (5.14) (0.00) (4.87)
0.29 –5.99 0.00∗∗ –5.17
(0.6) (4.25) (0.00) (4.8)
On Europe, larger banks 16.79∗ –0.94 5.32 –0.83 –3.66
(9.89) (1.79) (8.29) (3.19) (8.22)
–0.7 11.57 –0.79 –5.55
(1.78) (7.3) (3.2) (8.14)
On Latin America,  65.51∗∗∗ 2.27 11.78 6.4 8.15
larger banks (14.73) (3.2) (17.81) (5.11) (17.39)
3.9 45.17∗∗∗ 6.67 –2.87
(3.19) (12.98) (5.11) (17.02)
Notes: Positive trend growth to Europe, with even higher trend growth to Latin America. Procyclical
lending with U.S. GDP, but not signiﬁcant. Low interest rates in United States increase claims abroad,
but not with statistical signiﬁcance. In general, destination country interest rates economically unim-
portant for claims. While statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are often observed across banks, we focus
our attention on the elasticities reporting instead of the diﬀerences reporting. Number of observations
  34,650; number of groups   89. With constant, log-likelihood   –248690.9, pseudo R2   0.000; with-
out constant, log-likelihood   –248735.4; pseudo R2   0.000.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 5C.2 Elasticities of response of cross-border claims, 2001:Q3–2004:Q2
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
On Europe, smaller banks 66.82∗∗∗ 11.17∗ 27.35 –20.54 –3.99
(26.12) (6.19) (25.24) (20.14) (23.7)
11.93∗∗ 67.2∗∗∗ –11.73 –24.36
(6.19) (19.38) (19.84) (22.22)
On Latin America,  14.38 0.36 –4.73 –0.28 1.48
smaller banks (27.91) (3.46) (28.58) (2.45) (24.89)
0.38 –3.60 –0.27 0.81
(3.45) (21.37) (2.44) (23.55)
On Europe, larger banks 171.19∗∗∗ 12.49 –109.2∗∗∗ 58.84∗ 36.48
(52.45) (10.89) (45.36) (35.59) (42.3)
14.41 –20.3 76.74∗∗ –7.99
(10.88) (37.17) (35.22) (40.27)
On Latin America,  –46.11 9.41 172.93∗ –99.62∗ –42.51
larger banks (91.33) (18.58) (99.05) (54.11) (89.11)
7.88 116.3∗ –100.42∗ –18.1
(18.52) (68.31) (53.35) (82.65)
Notes: Larger banks reversed their trend of cross-border credit growth to Latin America, while cross-
border ﬂows from smaller banks had more pronounced trends. Slowdowns in the United States re-
inforced this pattern with respect to Latin America, but cross-border claims accelerated instead with re-
spect to European countries. Number of observations   6,844; number of groups   62. With constant,
log-likelihood   –55020.58, pseudo R2   0.000; without constant, log-likelihood   –55029.28, pseudo
R2   0.000.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 5C.3 Elasticities of response of local claims, 1986:Q1–2001:Q2
Country real  U.S. real  Country real  U.S. real 
Trend GDP GDP interest rate interest rate
On Europe, smaller banks –0.82 0.53 13.12 2.38 4.71
(8.85) (3.86) (11.01) (5.33) (10.39)
0.47 12.43 2.39 4.94
(3.8) (8.09) (5.33) (10.09)
On Latin America,  –1.02 –1.27 27.57 0.00 –24.61
smaller banks (16.28) (3.43) (20.16) (0.00) (19.06)
–1.30 26.64∗∗ 0.00 –24.37
(3.41) (13.81) (0.00) (18.69)
On Europe, larger banks 5.58 0.22 6.59 1.50 3.00
(5.37) (1.74) (6.53) (3.15) (6.46)
0.60 11.25∗∗∗ 1.46 1.51
(1.7) (4.75) (3.15) (6.30)
On Latin America,  1.51 2.48 11.47 3.27 41.63
larger banks (25.98) (8.73) (32.18) (11.13) (30.57)
2.13 13.28 3.31 41.34
(8.60) (22.85) (11.13) (29.82)
Notes: None of the portfolio terms appear statistically signiﬁcant in the local claims regressions for the
ﬁrst ﬁfteen years of the data sample. Number of observations   5,501; number of groups   25. With
constant, log-likelihood  –36787.49, pseudo R2 0.000; without constant, log-likelihood  –36788.48,
pseudo R2   0.000.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.References
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Comment Matías Braun
Linda Goldberg presents an interesting analysis of the international expo-
sure of U.S. banks since the mid-1980s. The very rich data set allows a more
direct look at how this key component of cross-country ﬂows behaves
across a number of important dimensions. Touching upon the debate over
the costs and beneﬁts of foreign lending, special attention is paid to the
cyclical properties of these exposures. Her stylized facts of U.S. banks’ for-
eign claims may be summarized as follows:
• Across countries, U.S. banks’ foreign claims are concentrated in Eu-
rope, where they primarily take the form of cross-border claims.
Claims on Latin American countries, where the local component is
much larger than in Europe, comprise a much smaller fraction of total
exposures. Foreign claims in Latin America are dominated by U.S.
banks’ claims.
• Foreign exposures have been growing strongly since the early 1990s,
even relative to total banking system assets in the United States. As
time passes, bank-to-bank and public borrowing are being displaced
by lending to nonbank borrowers. During the ﬁrst half-decade of the
twenty-ﬁrst century, claims of small banks on Latin America, partic-
ularly the cross-border component, exhibited large reductions.
• Claims of large banks and local claims tend to be relatively more
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Adolfo Ibáñez.stable. The volatility of claims does not appear to be much larger in
Latin America than in Europe.
• U.S. banks’ foreign claims are not robustly related to either U.S. or cli-
ent country business cycle variables such as GDP growth and interest
rates. This pattern does not seem to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when
comparing across regions, bank size, and type of claims. If anything,
claims on Latin American countries tend to be less procyclical than
those on European nations.
The background question of this paper may be what role foreign bank
lending plays in the transmission and ampliﬁcation of shocks. The major
strengths of the paper are, ﬁrst, that it addresses the issue by taking a direct
look at what very rich data on U.S. bank foreign claims can say, and sec-
ond, that it does do so in a relatively model-free way. The analysis shows
that the volatility and cyclical properties of foreign bank lending are not at
all easy to explain. In particular, the ﬁndings contrast sharply with the idea
that foreign lending is critical in the understanding of the high volatility
present in emerging markets. Given the nature of the data and the simple
approach, the results are hard to pass by, opening the door for new, inter-
esting questions that the microdata approach may be able to answer.
International capital integration remains a contentious issue within
both the academic and the policy communities. The evidence of a positive
eﬀect of capital account openness on growth is far from unquestionable.
On the one hand, Quinn (1997), Klein and Olivei (2000), Edwards (2001),
and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (1999) have all argued that an em-
pirical link between growth and openness is indeed present and relevant in
economic terms. However, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Rodrik
(1998), and Kraay (1998) have questioned this ﬁnding. Even if capital ac-
count openness turns out to be positively associated with average growth
rates and causality can be established, allowing free ﬂow of capital may not
be welfare enhancing if it brings about instability and the possibility of se-
rious crises. While Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) argue that this
is indeed the case empirically, Glick and Hutchison (2005) not only cast
doubt on that ﬁnding but argue that the data actually show that openness
helps avoid crises. Also, the eﬀect that capital ﬂows may have on the recip-
ient countries seems to be quite heterogeneous. Of course the discussion is
not limited to academia. The potential eﬀect of cross-country capital ﬂows
on volatility and the deepening of internal disequilibria has been one of the
reasons capital controls were imposed in otherwise liberal, outward-
oriented countries such as Chile.
This is, of course, not the ﬁrst time the role of foreign lending has been
studied. The eﬀects of foreign bank lending on the host country have at-
tracted a lot of attention in academic and policy circles. On the bright side,
aside from being a source of scarce capital, foreign banks are viewed as
The International Exposure of U.S. Banks 233helping to smooth country-speciﬁc shocks, and even changing local insti-
tutions in a way that improves the eﬃciency of credit allocation (Levine
1996). On the negative side, they are seen as conduits for the ampliﬁcation
and international transmission of shocks. This last mechanism seems to be
real, at least in some contexts. Peek and Rosengren (2000), Van Rijck-
eghem and Weder (2001), and Galindo, Micco, and Powell (2004) provide
interesting empirical evidence in this respect. Studies like these, however,
have important shortcomings in that in general they either represent very
particular situations in which the aggregate magnitude of the eﬀects is un-
clear or base their conclusions on indirect evidence. One of the biggest
strengths of Goldberg’s paper is to tackle the issues at hand by taking a di-
rect look at the microdata and asking how foreign banks (in this case, U.S.-
based ones) actually behave. To this purpose the author has compiled (in
Goldberg 2002) a very rich set of data consisting of a time series panel of
individual U.S. banks that report exposures to foreign markets to U.S. reg-
ulators. Without getting into a particular mechanism the paper asks very
generally whether the behavior of the claims of these banks on Latin Amer-
ica diﬀer from those on European countries in terms of volatility and cycli-
cality. The evidence turns out to be unsupportive of the view that foreign
lending has an important role in explaining the higher volatility that Latin
American economies exhibit. None of the patterns one would expect un-
der that view seem to be found in the data in a clear or robust way. Foreign
exposures on Latin American countries are not signiﬁcantly more volatile
than those on European ones, nor are cross-border claims relative to local
ones. It is not clear that smaller, supposedly less informed banks exhibit
higher volatility either. In terms of cyclical behavior, foreign claims on
Latin America (especially of the cross-border type) are not more procycli-
cal with respect to local factors.
Given the generality of the analysis and the data used, it is diﬃcult to ar-
gue against these ﬁndings. However, this generality does not come for free,
in the sense that it can mask important features of the credit market that
average out in the portfolio-type speciﬁcation used. Consider, for instance,
the eﬀect of foreign lending in the local credit market, depicted in ﬁgure
5C.1.
In an integrated market, agents face a perfectly elastic supply of funds at
the global real interest rate. Changes in the local demand for credit or in-
vestment opportunities trigger quick and large responses in the form of
foreign capital ﬂows. In this case, foreign claims would be procyclical with
respect to GDP growth if this is thought to be a proxy for the state of the
demand for credit. Unless one is prepared to argue that these changes in
the demand for credit do not reﬂect fundamentals in a consistent way (not
an uncommon assertion), it is clear that volatility per se is not necessarily
bad, since swings in foreign claims reﬂect rapid adjustment to new funda-
mentals rather than ﬁckle reactions. Even if that were the prevalent case,
234 Linda S. Goldbergone still needs to consider that the reaction of foreign capital to local credit
supply shocks also manifests itself as volatility. In this case the counter-
cyclical nature would actually reduce overall volatility.
The paper bases most of its conclusions on the comparison between the
behaviors of claims on European vis-à-vis Latin American countries. A
more primitive question to ask is whether foreign lender claims are diﬀer-
ent from domestic lender ones in any signiﬁcant dimension. Figure 5C.1
suggests that a more appropriate benchmark would be the behavior of lo-
cal banks in each country. The point is that one can explore further the
main issues in this paper by distinguishing credit supply from credit de-
mand shocks, and by looking at how foreign claims correlate with local
credit (or GDP growth) under diﬀerent states. The simplest extension of
the empirical model in the paper would be to allow the coeﬃcients of GDP
growth to vary with the level of (risk-adjusted) local interest rates via the
inclusion of interactive terms. A second step would allow for asymmetries
in the eﬀect of each variable. Extensions such as these could shed greater
light on the desirability of foreign participation in local credit markets un-
der diﬀerent assumptions about the extent to which local market condi-
tions reﬂect fundamentals rather than animal spirits. For instance, it could
be the case that foreign claims are only responsive to positive credit de-
mand shocks (box 1 in second panel of ﬁgure 5C.1). Under the assumption
that those situations reﬂect primarily credit booms, the evidence would be
supportive of the negative view of foreign bank participation. The conclu-
sions and policy implications would be quite diﬀerent if foreign ﬂows were
particularly responsive to local supply shocks (boxes 3 and 4) and there
was indication that these are the result of deﬁciencies in local institutions.
Other (small) issues in the paper deserve some attention. First, the de-
pendent variable is not net capital ﬂows; it also includes revaluations. Un-
der interest rate parity, movements of interest rates and exchange rates are
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Fig. 5C.1 Foreign lending and the local credit marketlinearly related. This implies a mechanical relationship between the de-
pendent and independent variables in the paper’s empirical model. Also,
deviations from interest parity are probably not unrelated to the volatility
or cyclicality of foreign claims, which makes interpretation of diﬀerences
across Europe and Latin America troublesome. Allowing for a richer dy-
namic structure in the empirical model could be helpful. The static ap-
proach runs into some diﬃculties. For instance, while interest rates are
forward looking, GDP growth is not. Also, only unexpected movements
should matter, unless there are important adjustment costs.
When the claims of all banks are aggregated, the endogeneity of local
GDP and interest rates makes it even more problematic to interpret the re-
sults in a causal way. Once the analysis focuses on bank-level data (partic-
ularly for small banks), the interpretation of the results can shift from
simple correlations to causality. When computing signiﬁcance levels, the
potential correlation of the many observations for each bank and country
should be taken into account.
Finally, the micro approach Goldberg’s paper suggests opens a number
of ways in which the literature on capital ﬂows and capital controls can be
expanded and deepened. Exploring speciﬁc mechanisms in the context of
bank-level data allows easing the endogeneity and omitted-variable bias
concerns typically present in macro studies. For instance, the within-
country, cross-bank dimension of the data should be informative of
whether herd behavior is indeed a typical outcome, as would be expected
under informational asymmetries. Contagion may be assessed by exploit-
ing the within-bank, cross-country data. Bank characteristics can inform
on learning and its eﬀect on the decision to focus or diversify operations.
The interaction of these characteristics with the host-country dimension of
the data speaks to the importance of relationships, and the choice of
whether to lend across borders or to set up local operations.
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